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Local Institutions and the Dynamics of Community Sorting †
By Andrea Robbett *
This paper studies the dynamics by which populations with hetero-
geneous preferences for public good provision sort themselves into 
communities. I conduct laboratory experiments to consider which 
institutions best facilitate efficient self-organization when residents 
can move freely between locations. I find that institutions requiring 
all residents of a community to pay equal taxes enable subjects to 
sort into stable, homogeneous communities. Though sorted, residents 
often fail to attain the provision level best suited for them. When resi-
dents can vote for local tax policies with ballots, along with their 
feet, each community converges to the most efficient outcome for its 
population. (JEL C73, D72, H21, H41, H71, H73)
Americans are a highly mobile population, with 12 to 15 percent of residents moving to a new location each year.1 A significant question is how individuals 
choose their communities and, in doing so, sort themselves geographically. At the 
same time, one of the most important roles of local communities is to provide public 
goods and services, such as roads, schools, libraries, police, and fire protection, and 
so forth. Residents typically vary in their demand for these services, and how to 
provide them efficiently in light of this heterogeneity is a central problem of public 
economics.
The cornerstone of local public finance is the Tiebout model (1956), which sug-
gests that mobility can provide a market-based solution to the problem of demand 
revelation. If households can move freely between jurisdictions, Tiebout proposed 
that residents will vote with their feet and move to the community where the local 
taxes and public expenditures best suit them. In doing so, they will sort themselves 
by their preferences and can then be taxed according to their demand. Thus, optimal 
public good provision can be achieved at the community level.
The model’s underlying premise, that mobility can lead to efficient outcomes, has 
been subsequently applied to areas far beyond public economics, including coali-
tion formation, consumer choice, and labor market sorting. However, it is unclear 
whether the ability to vote with one’s feet does in fact lead to the formation of opti-
mal communities. Since the inability to measure a household’s true demand for pub-
lic goods is the central motivation for Tiebout’s proposal, it is perhaps unsurprising 
1 Averaging over the past decade, 13.5 percent of Americans have moved per year (Bureau of the Census 
2000–2010).
* Department of Economics, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT 05753 (e-mail: arobbett@middlebury.edu). 
I thank Charles Plott, Leeat Yariv, Rod Kiewiet, John Ledyard, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and the Harvard Decision 
Science Laboratory.
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.3.136 to visit the article page for additional materials and author 
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
VoL. 6 No. 3 137robbett: local institutions and the dynamics of community sorting
that attempts to directly test whether migration patterns are driven by preferences 
have proven difficult and that the evidence has often been varied and inconclusive. 
But public goods preferences can be readily generated in laboratory experiments by 
adjusting the payoffs that subjects receive from the outcome of a public goods game, 
and the dynamics of community formation may then be observed in a controlled 
environment. In addition, experiments can test the effectiveness of various institu-
tions in facilitating efficient provision that would otherwise be very costly to assess 
in the field.
This is the approach taken in this paper and, ultimately, the findings reported here 
suggest that the ability to vote with one’s feet is not sufficient for achieving optimal 
allocations. However, when subjects can vote for local tax rates with their ballots, as 
well as with their feet, optimal outcomes are typically reached. These results indi-
cate the importance of local governance, in conjunction with mobility, in achieving 
efficient local outcomes—both in public finance and in the variety of domains to 
which the Tiebout model has been applied.
This paper considers a simple environment with three natural properties. First, 
the population has heterogeneous preferences for the public good: there are those 
who greatly benefit from the public good provided within their community, and 
those who benefit very little. Second, the preferences of the agents are unobserv-
able to others, and so a single community cannot charge different prices to different 
preference types. Finally, there are multiple locations and agents have full mobility 
between them. These experiments are not intended as a precise depiction of local 
public finance and residential choice in all its complexity, but, rather, as an attempt 
to gain insight into the fundamental mechanism and processes that Tiebout envi-
sioned by studying movement decisions within this simple environment.
The goals of this paper are: (i) to consider whether mobility is, in itself, sufficient 
for achieving optimal public good provision; (ii) to analyze the dynamics that may 
prevent optimality from being reached; and (iii) given these dynamics, to assess 
which institutions may be most successful in facilitating efficient self-organization.
Four experimental conditions were conducted, each corresponding to an institu-
tion governing how public good contributions are determined. The first is the stan-
dard voluntary provision mechanism, which allows residents to contribute different 
amounts within the same community and is therefore susceptible to free riding. This 
corresponds to the baseline that Tiebout’s model was proposed to improve upon. It 
is compared with three different provision mechanisms requiring all residents of a 
community to make the same contribution by means of a local tax. Under the first 
such institution, each location is associated with a different fixed, posted tax rate 
that remains the same for the duration of the experiment, and all subjects must con-
tribute this amount in each period that they reside there. Among the locations are 
those offering the optimal tax rates for each of the preference types. Similarly, under 
the second institution, each location is associated with a fixed, posted total contri-
bution level, and all subjects must contribute an equal share of this amount. These 
institutions reflect Tiebout’s assumption that there exists a large number of available 
communities, representing a complete range of expenditure packages that are “more 
or less set” (Tiebout 1956, 418). The final institution incorporates a simple form of 
local governance that is responsive to the preferences of the current population. In 
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each period, the location’s current members vote on the tax rate, the median voter’s 
preference is implemented, and all residents are required to contribute this amount.
I find, first, that the voluntary contribution communities are highly unstable. The 
subjects continually move between locations throughout the experimental session 
and this chronic movement leads to efficiency significantly below even that pre-
dicted under the Nash equilibrium for a single, fixed community.
Under all three of the institutions requiring all members of a community to make 
equal contributions, subjects separate by type into an optimal partition. When they 
are able to vote only with their feet, by moving between communities offering fixed 
taxes or provision levels, subjects often become stuck at local, inefficient equilib-
ria such that they under- or over-provide the public good. Though they sort into 
separate, homogeneous communities, the subjects often fail to attain the optimal 
provision within these communities, because they are unable to coordinate on the 
location offering the optimal tax-provision bundle for their type. This suggests that 
the ability to vote with one’s feet is not sufficient for achieving optimal outcomes: 
the existence of communities with optimally designed local tax policies does not 
guarantee that they will be entered, and inertia can prevent optimality from being 
reached.
Under the voting institution, residents can vote both with their feet and with bal-
lots. The subjects vote to enact their optimal tax rates, and the communities con-
verge to the optimal outcomes for their populations. The ability to vote with their 
feet enables the subjects to sort by type, while the ability to vote with their ballots 
enables them to then adjust the community policy once they have arrived. This sug-
gests that an internal mechanism that allows residents to influence community policy 
without needing to relocate may be necessary for overcoming coordination failure 
and achieving optimal allocations. Although Tiebout did not address the question of 
local governance, these results suggest that both local politics and system dynamics 
may be essential for determining whether local public goods are provided efficiently.
The Tiebout model was not presented as a descriptive model of residential choice, 
but as an innovative “conceptual solution” to the problem of demand revelation.2 
Tiebout introduced the idea of local public goods that were geographically exclud-
able: since they were available only to those living within a jurisdiction, anyone 
wishing to consume the local public good would have to move into the commu-
nity and pay the associated local taxes. Rather than relying on residents to truth-
fully report their preferences within a community, Tiebout proposed that they would 
reveal their true preferences by relocating to the community that perfectly matched 
their needs.
Since the appearance of Tiebout’s work, the theoretical literature has filled in and 
extended Tiebout’s sparse framework, formalizing his insights while incorporat-
ing housing prices, land provision, spillovers and crowding, as well as considering 
income heterogeneity and redistribution, and analyzing the determination of public 
good supply and its political requirements. This literature suggests that sorting may 
be difficult to achieve, and whether an efficient allocation is reached often depends 
2 Tiebout (1956, 424). Oates (2006) provides a discussion of whether Tiebout intended his paper as a descriptive 
theory or purely as a clever thought experiment.
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on the specifics of the environment. The goal of this paper is to strip away this 
complexity, return to the simplified setting that Tiebout addressed, and to study the 
underlying dynamics of the residential sorting process in the absence of specific 
environmental factors.
One approach has been to complete Tiebout’s analogy of local public goods as 
private goods, by integrating the model into a general equilibrium setting. This work 
has largely found that Tiebout’s proposition holds only under highly restrictive con-
ditions.3 The general equilibrium interpretation is reflected here in the experimental 
sessions that offer agents a wide range of fixed expenditure packages. An alterna-
tive approach departs from Tiebout’s assumptions by incorporating models of local 
governance and considers the simultaneity of selecting a community and voicing 
political preferences while there.4 These models have primarily focused on majority 
rule, and are captured by the voting institution considered in this paper.
There is also a vast empirical literature aimed at testing the implications of the 
Tiebout model within communities in the United States. Many studies have shown 
local sorting along demographic factors, such as income, race, and education, as 
well as by political and cultural preferences.5 However, the extent to which residents 
move in response to their preferences for public goods, sort into communities where 
other residents share their preferences, and consume their optimal package of local 
services, is far less clear (Dowding, John, and Biggs 1994).6
The difficulty in measuring public goods preferences and how they drive move-
ment decisions suggests that laboratory experiments can be particularly useful in 
understanding the mechanisms of residential choice and community sorting. The 
experiments in this paper, which allow agents with different preferences to sort by 
local tax rates and provision levels, are, to my knowledge, the first of their kind, but 
build on recent experiments on voluntary public good provisions in endogenously 
formed groups. Voluntary contributions experiments in fixed groups have consis-
tently found that contributions are initially midway between optimal and Nash equi-
librium levels, but quickly decline and approach the equilibrium (Ledyard 1995).
Experiments that allow subjects to select their group in each period have shown 
that free mobility is not sufficient to sustain contributions and, if movement is unre-
stricted, free riders will chase cooperators from location to location (Ehrhart and 
Keser 1999). Implementation of formal boundary rules or other mechanisms that 
current members may use to control group composition have been successful at 
increasing contributions, though subjects are sometimes prone to over exclusion.7 
3 See Wooders (1999) for an overview.
4 For instance, Westhoff (1977); Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984, 1993); Konishi (1996); Kollman, Miller, 
and Page (1997).
5 See, for instance, Costa and Kahn (2000) and Bishop (2008).
6 Consistent with Tiebout’s assumptions, American cities vary greatly in public services provided and demanded 
(see, Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1982; Stein 1987). While survey data have suggested that a household’s decision to 
move is rarely based on public expenditures (Rhode and Strumpf 2003), there is also considerable evidence that 
public services and taxes are significant factors in neighborhood choice once a household has already decided to 
move (Reschovsky 1979; Fox, Herzog, and Schlottman 1989; Percy, Hawkins, and Maier 1995). However, the few 
direct tests of migration based on local policy changes have produced conflicting conclusions (see, for instance, 
Been and Gupta 1997; Cameron and McConnaha 2006; Banzhaf and Walsh 2008; and Greenstone and Gallagher 
2008 for conflicting evidence on migration in response to environmental impacts).
7 Page, Putterman, and Unel (2005); Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon (2008, 2009); Charness and Yang (2010).
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Experiments have also shown that subjects will vote with their feet for institutions 
allowing them to punish free-riders (Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach 2006).
When subjects differ in the returns that they receive from the public good, there 
is a clear dynamic in which high demanders repeatedly form new groups with high 
provision. They are then followed by others, provision declines, and the cycle restarts 
(Robbett 2010). This chasing phenomenon persists even when the public good is 
purely nonrivalrous, such that there is never monetary incentive to exit large groups. 
This suggests that people are often unwilling to remain where others are contributing 
less than they are, and so group stability may be contingent upon requiring equal con-
tributions from all members, as in the three tax institutions considered in this paper.
I. Environment
I consider a basic Tiebout-style environment, in which residents may move 
between communities providing different quantities of the public good. In each time 
period, all agents simultaneously select their location, where they receive a payoff 
that is increasing over public good provision in the community and decreasing over 
the amount that they personally contribute toward provision.
There is a finite set of agents,  = {1, … , n}, and of locations,  = {1, … , k}.
A state (l, x) is an n-tuple of locations l  = ( l 1 , …  l n ), where  l i is an integer 
between 1 and k, and an n-tuple of contributions x = ( x 1 , … ,  x n ). In other words,  l i 
denotes where agent i resides, and  x i is agent i ’s contribution.
The feasible values of x follow one of two cases. In the first case, contributions 
are voluntary and, for all i,  x i may be any number greater than or equal to 0. In the 
second case, contributions are uniform for all members of a location, such that for 
any two agents i and j,  l i =  l j implies that  x i =  x j . In this case, there is a mapping 
t :  ⇒  R + such that  x i = t( l i  ). In other words, t(l) describes the local tax associ-
ated with location l that all residents must contribute in each period that they reside 
there.
There exists a public good with three notable properties. First, the public good is 
purely nonrivalrous, such that it is not depleted by the presence of additional com-
munity members. Second, it is produced at constant returns to scale. Specifically, 
the public good provided is equal to the total contributions. Finally, the public good 
is local and there are no spillovers between communities: an agent’s contributions 
finance the public good only within his location and an agent receives a return from 
a location’s public good if and only if he resides there.
Let  X j be the quantity of the public good provided in location j. Then,
(1)   X j =  ∑ 
i |  l i =j
 
 
  x i .
The nonrivalry of the public good is a departure from Tiebout’s assumptions. 
He suggested production technology as the motivation for providing public goods 
at the local level and assumed that communities face a per capita cost curve that is 
u-shaped over the number of residents, implying an optimal community size that is 
less than the total population.
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These experiments consider a nonrivalrous public goods environment in order to 
study movement solely in response to preference differences, without the complica-
tion of crowding concerns that are particular to production technologies. In addition, 
if the population has highly divergent preferences and everyone within a location 
must pay a uniform local tax, then a pure public good in this environment need not 
imply that a population would prefer to cluster in a single location. The experimen-
tal design in this paper has the property that preference types would prefer to sepa-
rate when community members face a uniform tax policy. Finally, the pure public 
good environment gives subjects the best possible shot at being comparatively suc-
cessful in the voluntary contributions case, when free riding is the only obstacle to a 
society achieving the most efficient possible outcome by pooling its resources into 
a single community.
In each period, each agent i receives a payoff from residing in location  l i :
(2)   π i (l, x) =  A i ln  ( X  l i  ) −  x i .
Agents differ only in the parameter  A i , which determines their marginal rate of 
substitution between the public good and private consumption.8 It is easily shown 
that the best response of agent i is to contribute the exact amount necessary to bring 
the collective community contributions to  A i :
(3)   x ∗i = max  ( 0,  A i −    ∑ j |  l j = l i ,  j≠i    x j ) .
This is the best response both myopically and in a game with a known, finite 
number of periods, as in the experimental design of this paper (described in detail in 
the next section). Thus, when agents are able to voluntarily contribute any amount 
to the public good, in equilibrium each community’s total provision will equal the 
maximum value of A represented in the community. However, the efficient level of 
provision for the community (which maximizes the aggregate payoffs of its resi-
dents) is equal to the sum of the parameters A in the community. Therefore, when 
contributions are voluntary, the public good is under-provided in equilibrium.
Under an institution with uniform tax policies, all residents of community j pay 
an equal tax, t ( j). In addition, let n( j) denote the number of residents of commu-
nity j. Then the payoff function in equation (2) becomes
(4)   π i (l, x) =  A i ln  ( t ( l i ) × n ( l i ) ) − t ( l i ).
For any given number of residents, each agent has single peaked preferences over 
the community tax rates, such that i ’s utility is maximized at tax t =  A i . Thus, for 
each resident there is a trade-off between being in a large community and being in a 
8 This is a modification of the Cobb-Douglas preference function that has several useful properties—in par-
ticular, that agents are strictly better off as the level of public good in their community increases, that each type of 
agent has a preferred tax policy, and that an agent’s best response is to contribute less than his preferred tax when 
contributions are voluntary.
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community where the tax is close to their ideal policy. When the values of A in the 
society diverge sufficiently, as in the experiments described in the following section, 
there does not exist any intermediate tax rate that would make all agents better off 
pooling their resources than they would be sorting by type and consuming at their 
optimal taxes in smaller communities.
In the experiments in this paper, there are 4 agents for whom A = 5 (Low Types) 
and 4 agents for whom A = 85 (High Types). Figure 1 shows the payoff functions of 
each type over the tax rate, for communities of four agents (separate) and communities 
of eight agents (pooled). The range of taxes for which the High Types receive higher 
payoffs by pooling their resources in an 8-person community than by segregating in 
a 4-person community with their optimal tax policy of 85 is: t ∈ (19.72, 227.7). On 
the other hand, the Low Types would receive higher payoffs from pooling only if 
the larger community offered a tax in the range t ∈ (1.16, 13.4). As these ranges do 
not overlap, there is no tax rate for which both types would receive higher payoffs 
by being in a single community than they would by separating.
II. Experimental Design
All experimental sessions were conducted at the Harvard Decision Science 
Laboratory in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Participation was restricted to graduate 
and undergraduate students. Though most participants were Harvard University 
students, other local universities such as Boston University, Tufts University, and 
Northeastern University were also represented. Subjects participated in groups of 16 
or 24 people at a time, and interacted with seven anonymous others in the room using 
the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). In other words, each session 
Figure 1. Payoff Functions for the Two Types in Communities of Size Eight (Pooled) or Four (Separate)
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was populated by eight subjects, with two or three sessions running  concurrently to 
ensure that subjects did not know which participants were in their own session. Of 
the eight subjects in each session, four were randomly assigned to be “High Types,” 
who greatly benefited from public good provision in their community and for whom 
the optimal tax rate was 85. Four were “Low Types,” who benefited very little and 
preferred a tax rate of 5. In order to maintain the demand revelation problem that 
Tiebout sorting was proposed to solve, subjects did not receive specific information 
on the payoffs of the other participants, but were aware that there was variation in 
the population.
Subjects played a 20-period dynamic game. The number of periods was common 
knowledge. In each period, they first chose a location and then made a contribu-
tion to the local public good. There were six available locations, which remained 
the same for the duration of the experiment, and were labeled “Group 1” through 
“Group 6.” Subjects received information on the previous outcomes in all of the 
locations, but not the location or contributions of specific individuals. The method 
of determining the contribution the subjects made depended on the institution gov-
erning their session. The four institutions were Voluntary Contributions, Fixed Tax, 
Fixed Quantity, and Voting.
In the Voluntary Contributions (VcM) sessions, each subject could contribute 
however much they wished. The latter three institutions required all members of a 
community to make identical contributions.
Under the Fixed Tax institution, each of the locations was associated with a fixed, 
posted tax (t). Anyone who entered the location was required to contribute this 
amount in each period, for the duration of their time in that location. The provision 
quantity then depended on the number of residents who entered (i.e., t times the 
number of residents).
Under the Fixed Quantity institution, each location was associated with a fixed, 
posted provision quantity (X ) that was provided in this location in every period in 
which it was populated. The per capita taxes were then dependent upon the number 
of residents who entered (i.e., X divided by the number of residents). Among the 
available locations in the Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity conditions were those offer-
ing the optimal bundles for each of the preference types in the experiment. These 
institutions are most similar to Tiebout’s description of communities as offering 
public goods packages that remained fairly constant over time. One can also think of 
these institutions as capturing a form of local government that is not highly respon-
sive to the preferences of its constituents, such that local policies are entrenched.
Finally, under the Voting institution, the location’s current members voted on the 
local tax policy in each period. The median voter’s preference was implemented and 
all members were then required to contribute this amount in the period. In the case 
of even-numbered populations, the two median votes were averaged. The preference 
aggregation mechanism was fully explained to the subjects. Instructions for all four 
treatments are provided in the online Appendix.
A total of 17 sessions were run: five sessions under the Voting institution and four 
under each of the other three institutions. Under all four institutions, the subjects’ 
payoffs were given by equation (2), with A = 85 for High Types and A = 5 for Low 
Types. Subjects were not presented with this equation directly. Instead, each  subject 
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was given a table showing his payoff for each possible outcome. These payoff tables 
were provided on paper so that the subjects could refer to them throughout the 
experiment. In the VCM sessions, the table showed what the subject’s payoff would 
be for various combinations of personal contributions (shown in columns) and total 
contributions in the community (shown in rows). For each tax institution, the table 
showed the subject’s payoffs for various tax or expenditure policies (columns) and 
community sizes (rows). Thus, the subjects could use the table to determine what 
their payoff would be in any location, based on their expectation of the number of 
residents or the total voluntary contributions. The experiment began only after all 
participants correctly answered a series of comprehension questions regarding the 
procedure and their payoffs.
The sessions each followed the same basic procedure. At the start of each period, 
subjects simultaneously selected the location they wished to enter. They then sub-
mitted a contribution and received their payoff for the period. Finally, they observed 
the outcomes in each location over the previous three periods before making their 
next move. In all conditions, this information included the number of residents in 
each location, with the subject’s personal, realized payoff listed under the location 
he had resided in that period. Subjects also saw the fixed policies associated with the 
locations (in the Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity conditions), the previously enacted 
tax policies (in the Voting condition), or the total and personal contributions (in the 
Voluntary Contributions condition).9
In the first period, all subjects, in all conditions, began in the same initial location. 
The policy of this location under the Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity institutions was 
selected to be the same as the policy enacted in the Voting condition if all subjects 
voted for their ideal policy.10 Moving—selecting a different location than in the 
previous period—carried a cost of five experimental units.
Finally, note that communication was not permitted. Though communication is 
feasible in a small-scale lab experiment (and could facilitate efficient sorting in this 
context), in most cases it is implausible that communication could occur on the scale 
necessary to enable individuals to identify likeminded households, even within their 
own community, and to then coordinate movement.
A. Theoretical Predictions
A partition of agents is Nash stable if there does not exist any agent who would 
receive a higher payoff by unilaterally moving to a different location. A partition of 
agents is strong Nash stable if there does not exist any set of agents, all of whom 
would receive a weakly higher payoff and at least one of whom would receive a 
strictly higher payoff by coalitionally moving to different locations.
9 A chart showing the available information while making location choices is given by Table 3 in the online 
Appendix.
10 The initial condition was chosen to keep the conditions as consistent as possible under each institution. Since 
over four-fifths of subjects in the Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity sessions leave their initial group within the first two 
periods, the initial choice is unlikely to unduly influence the remainder of the session. Further, there is no difference 
in efficiency outcomes between Voting sessions that implemented the predicted tax and those that did not.
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Since the public good is pure, the state in which the entire population resides in a 
single location is strong Nash stable under Voluntary Contributions. However, under 
the Nash equilibrium contributions, this community under-provides the public good; 
the Low Types do not contribute anything and the High types contribute 85 among 
the four of them. Thus, the total provision level is equal to 85, less than 1/4 of the 
optimal level for the population.
The payoffs for the two types are sufficiently different that there exists a unique 
strong Nash equilibrium under Fixed Tax, Fixed Quantity, and Voting in which the 
two types separate into two homogeneous communities where they consume the 
optimal tax provision pair for their type. In this state, the Low Types are together in 
a location with (t, X) = (5, 20) and the High Types are together in a location with 
(t, X) = (85, 340).
However, under both Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity, two forms of suboptimal 
Nash equilibria exist. In the first, the types separate and consolidate but are in 
locations where the tax policy differs from the optimal policy for that population. 
Specifically, consider a state in which all four High Types are in a single community 
with tax  t H and all four Low Types are in a different, single community with tax  t L . 
Though High Types would prefer that  t H = 85 and Low Types would prefer  t L = 5, 
any state in which all four High Types are together paying  t H ∈ [8.7, 315], all four 
Low Types are together paying  t L ∈ [0.5, 18.5], and  t H sufficiently11 differs from  t L, 
is Nash stable.
The second form of suboptimal Nash stable states occur when the types are 
pooled in a single community with an intermediate tax policy. Any state in which 
all members are together in a community with tax t ∈ [4, 23] is Nash stable, as no 
subject would wish to independently exit a community of 7 others in favor of strik-
ing out on his own. Both of these suboptimal outcomes are eliminated as equilibria 
under the Voting institution.
III. Ultimate Outcomes and Efficiency
This section examines the outcomes that the subjects reach by the end of their 
experimental session. The efficiency of the outcomes to which subjects converge 
varies greatly across institutions. When contributions are voluntary, subjects attain 
payoffs significantly below those of the Nash equilibrium. The subjects under both 
the Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity institutions attain moderate payoffs, while the 
payoffs of those under the Voting institution nearly reach the strong Nash payoffs. 
Subjects sort into homogeneous communities under all three of the tax institutions, 
and these differences in efficiency are the result of subjects under the Fixed Tax and 
Fixed Quantity institutions providing a level of the public good that differs from 
their optimum.
11 Specifically, 5 ln (4  t L /5  t H ) <  t H −  t L < 85 ln (4  t H /5  t L ) must hold in addition to the above tax ranges.
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A. Efficiency convergence
I first compare efficiency convergence under the four institutions, relative to the 
baseline of the Nash equilibrium prediction under Voluntary Contributions, in which 
all subjects locate together, but the public good is severely under-provided. The 
voluntary contribution Nash equilibrium is taken as the baseline since it is both the 
outcome that Tiebout was attempting to improve upon and the outcome to which 
standard public goods games tend to converge. The average efficiency over the final 
5 periods of the 20-period experiment under each institution is given in Figure 2.12 
The most efficient outcome is represented by the dashed line, but is achievable only 
when residents can solve the demand revelation problem within a single community. 
The strong Nash equilibrium is the highest feasible outcome when residents sort 
into multiple communities, and is represented by the dotted line.
First, we see that the subjects achieve very low payoffs when contributions are 
voluntary, even relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction, suggesting that they 
are squandering their resources. Subjects may do worse than the Nash equilibrium 
outcome if they either locate in a single location, but contribute less than the Nash 
equilibrium provision, or locate across multiple locations and diffuse their resources 
12 Efficiency is smoothed over the final five periods so as to avoid over or underemphasizing incidental deviations.
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(or both). Further investigation into the cause of this inefficiency follows in the 
next section. Efficiency under both Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity is significantly 
greater than the baseline, at 33 percent and 35 percent, respectively, or approxi-
mately 50 percent of the strong Nash outcome.13 Finally, efficiency under Voting is 
significantly higher, and nearly reaches the strong Nash outcome. Thus, while the 
Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity institutions lead to moderate improvements in effi-
ciency relative to our baseline, they still fall short of facilitating efficient public good 
provision, and only under Voting do the subjects approach the optimal allocation.14
B. sources of Inefficiency
There are two distinct causes of inefficiency in this environment. Subjects may 
fail to properly sort by type or, upon sorting, may fail to provide the optimal level of 
public good for their community.
I first look at whether subjects reach a sorted partition. Figure 3 shows the propor-
tion of time, over the final five periods of the experiment, that the types are sorted 
into two separated, consolidated groups. A subject is considered “sorted” if he is in 
a location with at least two of the three others of his type, and with no more than one 
member of the other type.
For all three institutions under which community members must contribute equal 
amounts, subjects are highly successful in sorting into two homogeneous groups. 
Over the final 5 periods, subjects in these 3 conditions are sorted 94 percent of the 
time. While there is little difference in community composition by the end of the 
20-period sessions under Fixed Tax, Fixed Quantity, and Voting, the institutions 
do vary in how rapidly subjects sort. Subjects require an average of 2.5 periods to 
first reach a sorted partition under Fixed Tax, 3.6 periods under Fixed Quantity, 
5.95 periods under Voting, and 10.2 periods—if ever—under VCM.15
Although subjects are eventually well-sorted under all three tax institutions, the 
question remains as to whether they provide the optimal level of public goods for 
their type within these homogeneous communities. The average and percentage 
difference between what subjects actually pay and their optimal contribution are 
shown in Figure 4. Note that this includes both over- and under-contribution rela-
tive to the optimum. Unsurprisingly, contributions greatly differ from the optimal 
amounts when provision is voluntary. However, High Types under Fixed Tax and 
13 The difference is significant at the p < 0.01 level and significant at the p = 0.04 level when either clustering 
errors at the session level or treating each session as a single observation.
14 The effect of institution on efficiency is significant at p < 0.01 (F = 6.76, where the unit of observation is 1 
session). Voting efficiency is significantly higher than Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity efficiency: p = 0.02; p = 0.063 
when clustering at session level (as recommended by Fréchette 2012); and p = 0.076 using the wild cluster boot-
strap with imposed null hypothesis (as recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008). The p-values were 
calculated using Doug Miller’s percentile-t cluster bootstrap do file (http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/dlmiller/
statafiles/bs_example.do).
15 The difference between Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity sessions is not significant ( p = 0.33). The number 
of periods necessary to reach a sorted partition under Voting is significantly higher than Fixed Quantity at the 
0.05 level and lower than VCM at the < 0.01 level. The additional time needed to sort in the Voting sessions appears 
to be the result of two complementary factors. First, it takes some time for communities to implement the optimal 
tax rates, that motivate movement; and, second, the absence of posted tax rates means that it takes longer for sub-
jects to find similar individuals and coordinate into two locations.
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Fixed Quantity, as well as Low Types under Fixed Quantity, often deviate from their 
optimal contribution as well. Over the final 5 periods, High Types’ contributions dif-
fer from their optimum by approximately 30 percent under both of these institutions, 
and Low Types’ contributions differ from their optimum by 150 percent under Fixed 
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Quantity. Thus, instead of reaching the strong Nash stable outcome, subjects tend to 
get stuck at inefficient Nash stable equilibria under these institutions. The dynamics 
that cause subjects to sort themselves into communities with suboptimal policies are 
further explored in the following section. Finally, when subjects are able to vote for 
their local tax rate, contributions differ from optimal levels by 0.8 percent overall.
IV. Dynamic Results
I next consider the dynamics under each of the four institutions that lead to these 
final outcomes. Although the subjects under the VCM institution contribute, on 
average, at the Nash equilibrium level, perpetual movement through locations leads 
to efficiency below that of the Nash equilibrium. Under the institutions requiring all 
members of a community to contribute the same amount, the High Types very rarely 
exit large communities with many taxpayers. In the Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity 
sessions, this unwillingness to move into less-populated locations often results in 
the subjects becoming stuck at less efficient equilibria, in which public good provi-
sion differs from the optimum for their type. Finally, under the Voting institution, the 
communities converge to the optimal provision for their populations.
A. Voluntary contributions
The top left panel of Figure 5 shows the average contribution over time for each 
of the two types under the VCM institution. This graph suggests that, although the 
subjects are free riding, they are converging toward the equilibrium contribution 
level, and that the severe inefficiency we see in Figure 2 is therefore not driven by 
under-contribution relative to the Nash equilibrium level.
Instead, the inefficiency seems to be caused by the subjects moving frequently 
and dispersing their resources over multiple locations. Although a partition with 
all members of the population in a single location is both efficient and strong Nash 
stable in the VCM sessions, subjects do exit the all-inclusive community and they 
continue to move over the course of the session. The subjects are together in a single 
location in only half of all periods. While movement significantly declines over time, 
under all three institutions with local mandatory tax rates, there is no such stabiliza-
tion under Voluntary Contributions and, toward the end of the session, movement 
occurs with more than twice the frequency of the other institutions. In a free-answer 
survey conducted after the experiment, over 20 percent of subjects in the VCM ses-
sion said that their primary motivation for moving was that other group members 
were contributing less than they were.16
Even though it is the High Types who benefit most from being in communities 
providing the public good, they are the ones who typically initiate this movement by 
exiting large communities in favor of smaller ones or previously empty locations. 
16 The results of these surveys are tabulated and presented in Tables 1 and 2 in the online Appendix. This finding 
is consistent with the large body of experimental literature showing that subjects are willing to sacrifice their own 
payoff in order to “punish” those who are not behaving cooperatively, either via an explicit punishment mechanism 
(Fehr and Gächter 2000); making a Pareto damaging choice (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Charness 
and Rabin 2002); or by exiting a partnership (Hauk 2003).
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On average, High Types who move enter communities that previously contained 
0.79 fewer members than their own (not including themselves), while Low Types 
move to slightly larger communities, containing 0.34 more members than the com-
munity they exited.17 These dynamics are similar to those previously found in a 
linear, pure public goods environment, when subjects with different returns from 
the public good could move between locations.18 There is a difference, however, in 
the efficiency relative to the Nash equilibrium in the two environments. Since equi-
librium contributions are zero in a linear VCM, the public good is not provided and 
thus the agent’s equilibrium payoffs do not depend on his group. But in an environ-
ment where public goods are provided in equilibrium, agents benefit from being in 
larger communities, and frequent movement may be harmful. In this environment, 
the ability to move leads to worse outcomes for the subjects than if they played 
the Nash equilibrium within a fixed group, implying that mobility is detrimental to 
efficiency.
17 The difference in community size exited − community size entered between the two types is significant at 
the 0.1 level.
18 Robbett (2010).
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Finally, we look at the extent to which frequent movement is associated with 
lower payoffs under Voluntary Contributions. I first consider the within-subjects 
effect of moving on the current period’s earnings. Table 1 presents regressions of 
period earnings on the subject’s movement decision and contribution decision, using 
subject-specific fixed effects. Movement is associated with a large, immediate loss. 
Furthermore, this is no longer significant when controlling for the size of the com-
munity that the subject enters. However, this model captures only the immediate 
impact of moving on earnings. Even if a subject suffers a one-period loss of earnings 
as a result of moving, he may have bettered his position for the periods to follow. To 
address this possibility, I next treat each subject as a unique observation and look 
at the association between the number of times that the subject moved and the sub-
ject’s total earnings for the entire session. Table 2 presents OLS regression results 
of the subject’s total payoffs on his frequency of movement and his own average 
contribution. Those subjects who move frequently earn significantly less during the 
course of the experiment.19
19 Since we are looking only at VCM sessions, clustering at the session-level gives only four clusters. In Tables 1 
and 2, the standard errors are reported with and without clustering and the results are comparable. Since the wild 
bootstrap is not recommended for fewer than than five clusters, this method was not used. Note that Table 2 also 
suggests that movement is relatively more harmful for Low Types, who move less often. I thank an anonymous 
referee for pointing out this additional tie to the punishment literature, which has consistently found that individuals 
punish less as it becomes more costly to do so.
Table 1—Fixed Effects Regressions of Earnings on Movement
Dependent variable: Current period payoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Move −19.97*** −8.15 −19.97* −8.15
(5.62) (6.16) (7.04) (6.09)
community size — 5.20*** — 5.20*
— (1.19) — (1.88)
contribution −0.48*** −0.449*** −0.48* −0.449*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.17) (0.18)
Intercept 187.95*** 153.4*** 187.95*** 153.4***
(2.13) (8.18) (4.27) (13.7)
Observations 640 640 640 640
Clusters — — 4 4
Notes: This table reports estimates and standard errors from regressions in which each obser-
vation represents one subject-period in the VCM sessions. The variable move equals 1 if the 
subject chose a different location than the previous period, community size is the number of 
individuals in the current location, and contribution is the individual’s own contribution in the 
current period. Subject fixed effects are included. Standard errors are in parentheses and are 
clustered at the session level in columns 3 and 4.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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B. Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity
The Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity institutions are most similar to the environment 
envisioned by Tiebout: there exist many communities offering a wide range of exog-
enously determined local policies that remain constant over time. The residents, in 
turn, select the community whose tax-provision pair best suits them, but do not influ-
ence the local policies in their chosen community. Under the Voluntary Contributions 
institution, we saw that High Types were more likely to exit larger groups in favor of 
smaller ones, while Low Types were attracted to areas populated by contributing High 
Types. When communities have mandatory local taxes, this dynamic is reversed: the 
Low Types now flee the taxes, while the High Types are less likely to exit areas with 
other taxpayers. The Low Types exit the all-inclusive group in their first opportunity 
93.75 percent of the time under the Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity institutions, while 
less than half of the High Types do so. The left panel of Figure 6 shows the average 
size of the community a subject exits, relative to the size of the community he enters, 
for each of the two types under both Voluntary Contributions and the exogenous tax 
policy institutions (Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity). The right panel of Figure 6 shows 
how the likelihood that a high type exits his community declines over the number of 
other High Types in the community, both when this community provides the optimal 
policy and when it does not. Although the High Types exit communities with policies 
that differ from their optimum more frequently, they rarely exit when two or three 
other High Types are present.20
20 Probit regressions confirm that the number of High Types has a strong, significant effect on the exit decision: 
the presence of an additional High Type is associated with a 14 percent lower likelihood of exit in the following 
period ( p < 0.01 when clustering errors at the session level), whereas whether the subject is in a community with 
their optimal policy has a negligible effect.
Table 2—OLS Regressions of Total Earnings on Number of Moves
Dependent variable: Subject’s final payoff
High Types Low Types High Types Low Types
Moves −162.7*** −29.08*** −162.7** −29.02***
(53.57) (4.5) (43.72) (4.51) 
Average contribution 4.8 −12.9*** 4.8 −12.9***
(9.59) (3.07) (14.03) (1.68) 
Intercept 7,142*** 416*** 7,142*** 416***
(384.5) (21.8) (727) (40.4) 
 r 2 0.42 0.83 0.42 0.83
Observations 16 16 16 16
Clusters — — 4 4
Notes: This table reports estimates and standard errors from OLS regressions in which each 
observation represents one subject in the VCM sessions. The variable moves refers to the total 
number of times the subject switched locations and average contribution is the individual’s 
mean contribution to the public good over all periods. Standard errors are in parentheses and 
are clustered at the session level in columns 3 and 4.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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This unwillingness of High Types to exit larger communities causes them to be 
susceptible to a coordination failure such that, despite consolidating into a location 
with other High Types, they fail to attain the optimal tax and provision levels for 
their type. Figure 5 shows the average contribution over time under Fixed Tax (top 
right panel) and under Fixed Quantity (bottom left panel).
Once a subject arrives in a Nash stable state, he is unlikely to exit. While subjects 
who are in a state that is not Nash stable exit the majority of the time, subjects who 
do arrive in a Nash stable state exit in only 6.6 percent of opportunities. In the case 
in which subjects sort themselves into a state that is Nash stable but not strong Nash 
stable, subjects will stay approximately 92 percent of the time.
C. Voting
While subjects under the Voting institution take longer to sort themselves into 
two homogeneous communities than under Fixed Tax or Fixed Quantity, once they 
coordinate they are less likely to move, as they are able to set their tax within the 
location. Furthermore, 92.5 percent of subjects vote for their optimal tax policy by 
the end of the session, and so the optimal policies for each type are eventually imple-
mented within the sorted communities. The bottom right panel of Figure 5 shows 
that the contributions of each type converge to their optimum under the Voting 
institution.
Thus, mobility is most successful when communities have an internal process 
by which residents may adjust their local policies without being required to relo-
cate. The ability to vote with one’s feet allows types to separate and coordinate by 
moving to a community of similar types. Subjects implementing their own local 
policies require only a few more periods to coordinate into separate, homogeneous 
communities than those choosing among locations with fixed policies. The ability 
to vote with one’s ballot then allows the residents to adapt the community to their 
preferences, reducing the possibility that a community of like-minded residents fails 
to realize the policy best suited for them.
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V. Conclusion
This paper uses laboratory experiments to study the dynamics of movement 
and local public good provision in a simple Tiebout environment and to test the 
 effectiveness of four different institutions in facilitating efficient public good provi-
sion. The results suggest that institutions determining the level of the local public 
good provision within a community can greatly affect residents’ ability to coordi-
nate with those who share their preferences, and to converge to an optimal outcome.
Voluntary contributions communities enable residents with different prefer-
ences to make different contributions, without the need to relocate or divide their 
resources over multiple communities, but are susceptible to the same free riding and 
demand revelation problems that can plague public good provision at the federal 
level. This paper finds that voluntary contributions communities are characterized 
by free riding, instability, and inefficient movement, and replicates the dynamics 
previously found in local pure linear public goods games with two types of agents. 
This suggests that these patterns and instability are robust to differences in the pay-
off function, with one distinction: when public goods are provided in equilibrium, 
this frequent movement may lead to efficiency significantly below equilibrium pre-
dictions, and mobility may actually be harmful to efficiency.
Taxes requiring all members of a community to make the same contribution to 
the local public good are highly successful at sorting subjects by preferences into 
consolidated, homogeneous communities. However, subjects often coordinate 
into, and remain in, communities offering suboptimal tax-provision bundles for 
their type. This inertia suggests that mobility in itself is not sufficient for achieving 
an optimal allocation of public goods and that the existence of optimally designed 
policies is not sufficient for guaranteeing that communities offering these policies 
will be entered.
When subjects have an internal process for adapting the policies of the com-
munities they have entered, the local communities converge to the optimal 
policies for their residents. While subjects require slightly longer to sort into 
homogeneous communities when fixed local policies are not provided, they are 
eventually just as successful at reaching an optimal partition and, when they can 
then vote on the local policy, residents converge toward consuming their optimal 
level of public goods.
Tiebout ended his discussion by asking whether local governments should have 
fixed expenditure policies (Tiebout 1956, 423). The results of this experiment sug-
gest that agents with very different preferences will sort by preference type even 
when communities do not provide exogenous tax policies, and that local politics 
may be necessary for overcoming coordination problems, adjusting provision to the 
preferences of the residents, and reaching an efficient allocation.
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